Monday, October 13, 2014

Solicitation Requires Proof of Request or Demand for Money

State v. Abel (HSC September 24, 2014)
Background. James Abel was charged with the city ordinance of solicitation with animals in Waikiki, a violation of ROH § 29-13.2(b). At trial, HPD Sergeant Stacey Christensen testified that one day she was “enforcing parking violations” in Waikiki. She saw Abel “with birds fronting the Outrigger standing on the sidewalk.” Abel was putting birds on people and taking pictures of them with their cameras and the people would give him money. She couldn’t make out what they were saying and could not discern how much money was given to Abel. Abel moved to acquit and argued that the elements had not been met because the prosecution could not prove solicitation. The motion was denied. Abel argued that there was still insufficient evidence to show solicitation, which is basically defined as a demand for gifts or money. During his closing, Abel argued that “[m]erely extending the gesture of placing birds on someone and taking a photo is just an extension of the aloha spirit. It’s not meant to . . . be a solicitation.” Abel was found guilty and sentenced to a fine of $300 and a court fee of $30. Abel appealed, and the ICA affirmed. Abel petitioned for cert.

 Breaking Down a Criminal Offense. “The elements of an offense are such (1) conduct, (2) attendant circumstances, and (3) results of conduct as: (a) Are specified by the definition of the offense, and (b) Negative a defense[.]” HRS § 702-205. In this case, Abel was prosecuted for violating ROH § 29-13.2(b):

In the Waikiki special district, no person shall use any live animal in furtherance of any solicitation on any public property . . .
. . . .
(b) The person conducting the solicitation shall not place the animal on or otherwise transfer the animal to any other person.

Id. The HSC broke this ordinance down into the following elements: (1) a solicitation, (2) use of a live animal in furtherance of the solicitation, (3) a transferring of the animal by the person conducting the solicitation onto another person, and (4) the occurrence of the solicitation on public property in the Waikiki Special District. Id. “Solicitation” means “to request or demand money or gifts.” ROH § 29-13.1.

Solicitation Requires Proof of a Demand or Request. The crux of this case came down to interpreting the word “solicitation.” The HSC noted that even though the language of the ordinance—to request or demand money or gifts—is straightforward, it was still free to look elsewhere to ascertain its meaning. The HSC explained that “the plain language rule of statutory construction . . . does not preclude an examination of sources other than the language of the statute itself even when the language appears clear upon perfunctory review.” Keliipuleole v. Wilson, 85 Hawaii 217, 227, 941 P.2d 300, 304 (1997). One place to look would be the legislative history in order to “discern the underlying policy [that] the legislature sought to promulgate.” State v. McKnight, 131 Hawaii 379, 388, 319 P.3d 293, 307 (2013). When the court cannot glean the policy through legislative history, the court could be unable to determine if the literal construction would produce an absurd or unjust result. Keliipuleole, 85 Hawaii at 221, 941 P.2d at 304.

Luckily, there was plenty of evidence for the HSC to ascertain the policy underlying this ordinance. In the end, the HSC noted that the City Council passed this ordinance to regulate those requesting or demanding money from tourists in exchange for using animals. It was not designed to prevent folks from displaying and presenting animals to tourists or even prevent them from having tourists snap pictures with them.

Witnessing a Transaction is Not Enough to Prove “Solicitation.” Turning to this case, the HSC noted that there was only evidence of people paying Abel after he took a picture of them with parrots on them. The prosecution, however, has to prove a demand or request for money or gifts. No such demand was proven. According to the HSC, “Sgt. Christensen did not hear any conversations between Abel and other individuals, or overhear any statement or comment regarding a fee. There was no evidence that Abel had a sign requesting money or a tip jar on the public sidewalk that would imply money was expected. Likewise, there was no evidence that Abel made any hand or head gestures indicating a request for money.” And so, the conviction was reversed for lack of evidence.

Proving a Demand or Request. The HSC has drawn a very fine line. Folks standing around with birds in Waikiki can put their birds on tourists and let them take pictures with them so long as they don’t “request or demand” money or gifts. That means you can’t ask, put your hand out, or even have a tip jar “that would imply money was expected.” What about a “DONATIONS WELCOMED, (BUT NOT REQUESTED)” sign? Surely that’s not a demand, but perhaps it’s more of a request. So what if the sign said “DONATIONS WELCOMED (BUT NOT REQUESTED)”? Perhaps at that point a birdman would be tempting fate. What about a jar full of dollar bills and no sign at all? Would that “imply money was expected?” At least these guys are happy for now.

Wednesday, October 1, 2014

Cops can Execute a Warrant in the Middle of the Night in a Public Park

State v. Williams (ICA September 22, 2014)
Background. Fred Williams was in Cartwright Park in Honolulu after closing time. The signs around the park posted that no one can be there between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m. The police found him and cited him for being in the park during the off-hours. In the process, they discovered that an outstanding bench warrant (a judge ordered a warrant for his arrest for failing to show up to court on an unrelated matter) was out for him. He was subsequently arrested for that. After being placed in handcuffs, the police discovered a glass pipe, two lighters, and small baggies on his person. This discovery led to prosecuting him for possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia. The warrant, however, expressly and explicitly stated that it could not be executed between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. “on premises not open to the public.”

Williams moved to suppress on the grounds that the warrant was improperly executed. The circuit court granted the motion. The prosecution appealed.

The Limits of Executing Warrants. Warrants shall “contain a prohibition against execution of the warrant between 10:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. on premises not open to the public, unless a judge of the district or circuit court permits execution during those hours in writing on the warrant[.]” Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 9(b). The Williams warrant contained this prohibition. And yet the warrant was executed on a premises that was “not open to the public”—Cartwright Park after dark.

Court rules are interpreted like statutes. Molinar v. Schweizer, 95 Hawaii 331, 334-35, 22 P.3d 978, 981-82 (2001). When “the terms of a statute are plain, unambiguous and explicit, we are not liberty to look beyond that language for a different meaning.” State v. Haugen, 104 Hawaii 71, 75, 85 P.3d 178, 182 (2004). But this isn’t always the case. According to the ICA, when a literal construction leads to “an absurd and unjust result,” id., the court can resort to the legislative history to discern the intent behind the language.

“Not Open to the Public” Means Private and Places that the Public can go to. The ICA zeroed in on the part of the rule that forbid the police from executing warrants in places at night that were “not open to the public.” The Judicial Council of Hawaii’s Committee on Revision of the Rules of Criminal Procedure came up with these words in the 1970s. Back then, the drafters used the words “not open to the public” instead of “private” in order to avoid the technical and difficult questions related to title.

The ICA agreed with the prosecution that a literal reading of the prohibition lead to an absurd and illogical result. It concluded that limiting the execution of warrants “on public property only to those hours the property is technically ‘open’ is to make the exception a nullity.”

No Need to Fear Nighttime Warrant Executions Here. Warrants are normally not allowed to be executed at night because there is a “greater expectation of privacy that individuals possess in their homes at night” and a nighttime search creates a “heightened safety risk since people may tend to overreact to an entry by force in the dead of night[.]” State v. Richardson, 80 Hawaii 1, 7, 904 P.2d 886, 892 (1995). This concern, according to the ICA, is absent when the warrant is executed on public property.

And so the ICA vacated the suppression order and remanded the case back to the circuit court for further proceedings.

Rule 9 and the Homeless Hypothetical. The ICA appears to have held Rule 9’s “prohibition against execution of the warrant between 10:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. on premises not open to the public” does not prohibit the police from executing a warrant in a public park during off-hours. The details surrounding Williams and Cartwright Park in this opinion are few and far between. Perhaps Williams was standing around and the police approached him for being in the park after dark. That seems to fit well with the ICA’s interpretation of Rule 9.

But what if this wasn’t Cartwright Park? What if this was Aala Park and what if Williams was living in a tent? Or even under a shopping cart? Would the “greater expectation of privacy” still be absent? According to the ICA, the answer seems to be yes. The ICA held as a matter of law that the police may execute a warrant in the middle of the night so long as the person is on public property—even if you’re in a tent on that public property. That strongly suggests that the homeless do not have an expectation of privacy. Now, we will have to wait for such a case to come before the appellate courts to determine that much more difficult question.

Monday, September 8, 2014

Chit Chat with a Cop Didn't Arise to Custodial Interrogation

State v. Kazanas (ICA August 29, 2014)
Background. On Halloween night, a complainant was driving his car through Waikiki to watch the Halloween festivities. The driver got to Kuhio Avenue at an intersection and stopped to let a group of people cross. As he entered the intersection, a straggler ran across the road and ran into the car. A group surrounded the car and started pounding the windows and kicking the car. The back window cracked. The complainant saw a man on the hood with heavy boots stomping the windshield. The man then got off the hood, walked around to the driver, and punched the driver several times in the face.

Ex-cop, James Easley identified Gregory Kazanas as the man who punched the driver. Easley remembered Kazanas because when he was a cop, he jumped or fell from the ninth floor of a condo in Waikiki, landed on a beach chair on the pool deck, and was coherent when he responded to the scene. The driver in the meantime was able to drive off and find the police. Easley later saw police near the car. Easley walked through Waikiki and found Kazanas. He called the cops and they arrested Kazanas. One of the officers, Christy-Lynn Avilla took Kazanas to the hospital. She saw that Kazanas had cuts on his hands.

In the hospital waiting room, Avilla struck up a conversation with Kazanas in order to calm him down. She later testified that Kazanas was making rude comments at the hospital and she wanted to ask him questions unrelated to the case. She asked him if he had enjoyed Halloween and about the costumes he saw. She admitted that she did not apprise Kazanas of his right to remain silent, his right to counsel, or any other Miranda-Santiago rights. Instead, Avilla “told him that he was not allowed to talk about the case or say anything about what he had been arrested for.”

According to Avilla, out of this small talk, Kazanas said, “I wouldn’t have to punch people if they didn’t upset me.” The circuit court allowed the prosecution to use this statement against him at trial. He was found guilty of unauthorized entry into a motor vehicle in the first degree and sentenced to probation with 90 days jail. Kazanas appealed.

Small Talk with a Police Officer is not a Custodial Interrogation. The ICA’s analysis did not begin with the black-letter recitation of Miranda  warnings and when they are required to be given to suspects. Instead, it discussed why we have Miranda  in the first place. According to the ICA, Miranda warnings were “designed to safeguard a defendant’s privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.” It noted that the Miranda court back in the 1960s, “cited a number of police interrogation techniques that used psychological ploys and pressure to obtain statements from suspects in custody.” Thus, the Supreme Court of the United States required a suspect in custody to receive warnings of specific rights before being subjected to the “custodial interrogation.”

And so in this case there was no question that Kazanas was in custody. The issue was whether he was subjected to an “interrogation” by Avilla. “Interrogation” means “express questioning or its functional equivalent.” Innis v. Rhode Island, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980). It includes “any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Id. at 301. In addition to the Fifth Amendment, there’s Article I, Section 10 in the Hawaii Constitution. According to the ICA, the Innis definition was adopted for the state constitution. See State v. Ketchum, 97 Hawaii 107, 119, 34 P.3d 1006, 1018 (2001).

Here, the ICA held that Kazanas’ statement to Avilla was not the product of an “interrogation.” Although he had never been Mirandized, he was warned not to talk about the case. Once at the hospital, Avilla tried to engage in “small talk” to calm Kazanas down. There was no way, according to the ICA, that she could have anticipated that he would make an incriminating statement. It was not responsive to her questions about Halloween in Waikiki.

Judge Foley’s Dissent. Judge Foley wrote that when examining whether the circumstances point to an “interrogation,” the court must determine if the police officer should have known that “their words or actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the person in custody.” See State v. Naititi, 104 Hawaii 224, 236, 87 P.3d 905 (2004). Judge Foley agreed with Kazanas that even though Avilla did not intend to elicit an incriminating response from him through the seemingly innocuous questions about Halloween, she should have known it was likely to have elicited such a response. Avilla, unlike the detectives in Ketchum and State v. Ikaika, 67 Haw. 563, 698 P.2d 281 (1985), knew about the investigation. By asking Kazanas about his Halloween night she had invited him to describe his involvement in the events leading to his arrest. Thus, his statement about punching people was the product of a custodial interrogation. Moreover, Judge Foley believed that the use of the statement by the prosecution at trial was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the statement should have been suppressed.

Thursday, July 17, 2014

The Public's Right to Know (About Potential Juror Misconduct)

Oahu Publications Inc. v. Ahn (HSC July 16, 2014)
Background. Last summer, Christopher Deedy was on trial for the death of Kollin Elderts. After weeks of testimony, the case went to the jury for deliberation. The jury deliberated for several days before it became hopelessly deadlocked and the circuit court, Judge Karen Ahn, declared a mistrial. This case was covered by Oahu Publications, better known as the Honolulu Star-Advertiser, and KHNL/KGMB. On the fifth day of jury deliberations, Judge Ahn held five hearings that were not open to the public at the end of which, Judge Ahn sealed portions of transcripts pertaining to these sessions. At the last proceeding, Judge Ahn ordered the courtroom cleared a few times. The media did not object to the closing of the courtroom. When they resumed in the open, Judge Ahn declared a mistrial.

A few weeks later, the Star-Advertiser and KHNL/KGMB (the media) filed in the HSC petitions for a writ of prohibition and a writ of mandamus on the grounds that the closing of the courtroom and sealing of portions of transcripts violated the First Amendment. The media asked the HSC to issue a writ that prohibited Judge Ahn from further sealing the transcripts and unsealing what she has previously sealed. The media also asked for a writ that would prevent Judge Ahn from closing the courtroom and sealing documents during the re-trial (which is happening right now) without first providing notice, an opportunity to be heard, and the issuance of findings of fact for preventing public access to the courtroom.

The HSC eventually remanded the case with instructions to litigate the issue further by having the media file motions and allowing the State to respond. Judge Ahn granted the motion in part and explained her actions. She also unsealed parts of the transcript. The transcripts revealed that the closed sessions addressed a potential issue pertaining to juror misconduct. The issue started when a juror asked Judge Ahn’s clerk what they should do if “we feel one of the jurors is a friend of one of the sides?”

This lead to bringing in the foreperson for questioning. The foreperson reported that he noticed a juror eating lunch with “the family” and it looked to the foreperson like the juror was friends of the family based on interactions in the hallway outside the courtroom. The juror was brought in for questioning by Judge Ahn. The juror told the court that he or she “can be fair to both sides” in this case. Deedy objected to the questioning as insufficient, but was overruled.

Later sessions revealed that the jury was going to be deadlocked. Deedy revisited the sufficiency of the questioning by Judge Ahn and argued that if a retrial were to happen, this could bring about Double Jeopardy concerns. The State agreed and requested further questioning of the juror. At the final closed session, Judge Ahn questioned the juror further. The juror said that he shook hands with “one guy I used to work with . . . I think like almost seven years ago.” The juror said it did not influence him in this case. The juror, however, did say that he had some contact with someone associated with the case. The juror said that there was another time in which he saw a person that could be associated with the case. Deedy requested more questions to determine if there was in fact juror misconduct. The State objected. The remainder of the proceedings were sealed.

The proceedings returned to the HSC.

The First Amendment and the Qualified Right to Attend Jury Trials. “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press[.]” U.S. Const. Am. I. “The right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the first amendment.” Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980). This right is not unlimited. It is based on the considerations of “logic and experience.” Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal. for Riverside Cty, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986). “Experience” prong, the court must determine if “the place and process have historically been open to the press and general public” Id. The “logic” prong hinges on whether “public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.” Id. If both are satisfied, a qualified First Amendment right of access attaches to the proceeding. The SCOTUS held that the First Amendment applies to the evidence and testimonial phase of the trial, Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 488 U.S. at 580, as well as the testimony of minors, Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk Cnty., 457 U.S. 586, 606 (1982), and during voir dire. Press-Enter. Co., 464 U.S. 501, 505 (1984).

The Hawaii Constitution’s Right to Free Speech and Press. “No law shall be enacted . . . abridging the freedom of speech or of the press[.]” Haw. Const. Art. I, Sec. 4. In interpreting this provision, the HSC “considers the case law established under the first amendment of the United States Constitution.” In re: HGEA, 116 Hawaii 73, 84, 170 P.3d 324, 335 (2007). Even though the language between the state and federal constitutions are pretty much identical, the HSC “may find that the Hawaii Constitution affords greater free speech protection than its federal counterpart.” Crosby v. State Dept. of Budget & Fin., 76 Hawaii 332, 340 n. 9, 867 P.2d 1300 (1994). According to the HSC, throughout Hawaiian history, the public has enjoyed a “long tradition” of access to the courts. This tradition goes back to the 1820s as the kapu system gave way to more Westernized courts of law. “Courts are established for the judicial administration of justice. They are open to the public . . . . The fact that they are open serves as a safeguard of the integrity of our courts." State v. Hashimoto, 47 Haw. 185, 200, 389 P.2d 146, 155 (1963). Put differently, “[t]he words ‘public trial’ are self-explanatory.” Id.

“Procedural and Substantive Requirements.” So if the right attaches, the court has to undergo certain “procedural and substantive requirements.” The “procedural prerequisites to entry of an order closing a criminal proceeding to the public [are] (1) those excluded from the proceeding must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to state their objections; and (2) the reasons supporting closure must be articulated in findings.” United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1168, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 1982). In order to justify closing the courtroom, the court must find (1) closure serves a compelling interest; (2) there is a substantial probability that, absent the closure, the compelling interest would be harmed; and (3) there are no alternatives to closing the courtroom that would protect the interest. Oregonian Pub. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Ore., 920 F.2d 1462, 1466 (9th Cir. 1990).

So When Does the Court have to do this? The HSC examined when the trial court must make these provide opportunity to object and make findings. Here, the stage of the trial was no longer during the testimony of witnesses or the evidentiary phase of the case, but what it called the “midtrial examination of jurors.” The HSC also examined the sealing of transcripts of the closed proceedings as a close analogy.

Examining Jurors for Potential Juror Misconduct is a Critical Stage of the Trial Creating a Limited First Amendment Right for the Press. First off, the HSC noted that public access of the examination of jurors to determine the possibility of misconduct may infringe upon the defendant’s right to an impartial jury. U.S. Const. Am. VI; Haw. Const. Art. I, Sec. 14. This right means that the defendant enjoys the right to impartial jury deliberation, which “shall remain private and secret[.]” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 737 (1993); State v. Kim, 103 Hawaii 285, 292, 81 P.3d 1200, 1207 (2003) (“public policy demands that the sanctity of jury deliberations be vigorously guarded to ensure frankness and open discussion.”).

Whenever there is the possibility of juror misconduct, the trial court has a duty to investigate. State v. Yamada, 108 Hawaii 474, 479, 122 P.3d 254, 259 (2005). Herein lies the conflict. The investigation of juror misconduct must be made on the record, but that would include proceedings to which the public normally has access. From here, the HSC applied the “logic and experience” test to midcourt proceedings.

As for the experience portion, the HSC concluded that there is no clear tradition of “either open or closed proceedings when a court conducts a midtrial examination of jurors regarding misconduct.” And so it was a push. The HSC held that under the experience prong, there is “little guidance in this case and it is appropriate to give greater weight to the ‘logic prong[.]’” From there, the HSC held that logic supported an open courtroom. In the end, the HSC held that the qualified right of access to the courtroom at trial is “not extinguished by the mere necessity to conduct midtrial examination of jurors to investigate juror misconduct.”

The Trial Court did not Follow the Necessary Procedures. Having held that there was a constitutional dimension to these proceedings, the HSC looked to the closing of the courtroom. It noted that the trial court made no findings justifying the closure of the courtroom. The generalized statements later made by the trial court about the pressure of having the media there was simply insufficient. The court must “make factual findings specific to the circumstances that indicate the substantial likelihood that an open hearing would interfere with the defendant’s right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.”

The Same Goes for Transcripts. The HSC moved on to examine whether the transcripts should have been sealed. It applied the logic and experience test and held that the trial court must make findings justifying the sealing of transcripts—even after the trial is over. Here, the transcripts were sealed for nearly six months after the mistrial had been declared. The HSC held it should have been unsealed for the public sooner.

Monday, May 19, 2014

A Temper Tantrum about Going to bed Early isn't Terroristic Threatening

In re PP (ICA April 30, 2014)
Background. A minor was charged with terroristic threatening in the second degree. HRS § 707-717(1). He was accused of threatening by words or conduct to cause bodily injury to Jeffrey Kuewa in reckless disregard of the risk of terrorizing him. At trial before the family court, Kuewa testified that he is a counselor at a youth shelter in Haleiwa. He caught the minor smoking in his room and imposed and early bed time (EBT) at 7:00 p.m. Later that day, Kuewa discovered the minor had not finished his chores, was screaming, and was in an out-of-bounds area in the shelter. He gave him two more EBTs, but never told the minor. The next day, the minor approached Kuewa in an aggressive manner outside the shelter and glared at him. Kuewa told him the additional EBTs were based on going out of bounds and screaming. The minor told him he thought it was just for one day. Kuewa told him he was missing the point of an EBT and admitted he compared the minor a “little girl.” Kuewa testified that he was maybe expecting the minor to swing at him. He never did and walked back into the shelter.

Kuewa later learned that once inside the shelter, the minor was telling people that he was going to get Kuewa. The minor went into detail about how he was going to make Kuewa his “bitch” and would kick his ass. A counselor testified that as the minor said this, he was punching the couch and then “even threatened to kill Jeff, things like that.” Kuewa wasn’t around. He learned about it later and called the police. The counselor told the minor that he needed to stop acting like this or else he would not able to go to the beach. He stopped and went to the beach. When they all returned, Kuewa was there in the parking lot.

The family court found that the minor committed the offense. Minor appealed.

Terroristic Threatening and a True Threat. “A person commits the offense of terroristic threatening if the person threatens, by word or conduct, to cause bodily injury to another person . . . [w]ith the intent to terrorize, or in reckless disregard of the risk of terrorizing, another person[.]” HRS § 707-715. The state of mind needed to find the offense requires at a minimum recklessness as defined in HRS § 702-206. According to the ICA, the State was required to show that the minor, by word or conduct, threatened to cause bodily injury to Kuewa in reckless disregard of the risk of terrorizing him.

The “True Threat” Requirement. This offense requires proof that the conduct had the attributes of a “true threat.” “Proof of a ‘true threat’ focuses on threats which are so unambiguous and have such immediacy that they convincingly express an intention of being carried out. So long as the threat on its face and in the circumstances in which it is made is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific as of purpose and imminent prospect of execution, the statute may properly be applied.” State v. Chung, 75 Haw. 398, 417, 862 P.2d 1063, 1072-73 (1993).

Later, the HSC clarified that a “true threat” is something different than hyperbole and that the prosecution has to “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged threat was objectively capable of inducing a reasonable fear of bodily injury in the person at whom the threat was directed and who was aware of the circumstances under which the remarks were uttered.” State v. Valdivia, 95 Hawaii 465, 475, 24 P.3d 661, 671 (2001). Finally, the HSC again reiterated that proof of a “true threat” is required in State v. Martins, 106 Hawaii 136, 102 P.3d 1034 (2004).

Ranting and Raving on the Couch is not a True Threat. The ICA characterized the evidence as a couch-rant. It was “a temper tantrum by a frustrated and foul-mouthed kid who was reacting . . . to what he perceived as unjustified, unfair punishment. . . . The evidence is that he just sat there, punching on the couch, carrying on with curse words and adolescent taunts about how he would show whose dick is bigger, how he was going to get Kuewa for punishing him. Notwithstanding the caustic and hyperbolic language he used, there is simply no evidence that could reasonably support a conclusion that Minor was aware of anything but his own childish feelings about the circumstances.”

The ICA held that this was not a true threat. The Minor was having a tantrum on the couch and was making obscene, over-the-top threats to an adult who was not there. When ordered to stop or he won’t got to the beach, he stopped. The ICA reversed the family court’s findings and decree.

Chief Judge Nakamura’s Dissent. The Chief Judge wrote that there was sufficient evidence supporting the family court’s findings of the offense. The minor was shouting and punching the couch in the presence of two workers at the shelter. He was ranting about sexually assaulting and killing Kuewa when he came back to work. This was enough evidence for the Chief Judge.

Monday, May 5, 2014

Yes, Forgery Includes Using Counterfeit Cash

State v. Eberly (ICA March 31, 2014)
Background. Bardwell Eberly, Antony Moore, and Chrisitna Whitley were originally charged with forgery in the first degree. HRS § 708-853. Specifically, they were charged with “uttering” a forged instrument “purported to be United States Currency.” Eberly pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of forgery in the third degree. Before sentencing, however, the HSC in an unrelated case affirmed Eberly’s conviction and sentence to prison. The sentence was stayed pending appeal this entire time. Now that it had come down, the trial court in this case told Eberly that he could not be sentenced to probation. Eberly moved to withdraw his guilty plea. He was sentenced to a year in jail. Eberly appealed.

The Issue and the two big Procedural Problems. Eberly presented a straight-forward issue on appeal: the forgery statutes plainly and unambiguously do not include counterfeiting U.S. currency. The problem in getting to the issue is that it was never raised below. There’s also the additional problem of the guilty plea: “a guilty plea made voluntarily and intelligently precludes a defendant from later asserting any nonjurisdictional claims, including constitutional challenges to the pretrial proceedings.” State v. Morin, 71 Haw. 159, 162, 785 P.2d 1316, 1318 (1990).

The ICA got around these problems and reviewed the case de novo because the issue goes to the heart of a court’s jurisdiction in a criminal case. The “existence of jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo under the right/wrong standard. Questions regarding subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of a cause of action.” Amantiad v. Odum, 90 Hawaii 152, 158-59, 977 P.2d 160, 166-67 (1999). “If a court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of a proceeding, any judgment rendered in that proceeding is invalid.” Bush v. Haw’n Homes Com’n, 76 Hawaii 128, 133, 870 P.2d 1272, 1277 (1994). And so, the ICA did not review this issue for plain error but instead took a fresh de novo review to see if the circuit court had jurisdiction to enter the judgment of conviction and sentence. Turns out it did.

Jurisdiction over Criminal Proceedings. Circuit courts have jurisdiction over “[c]riminal offenses cognizable under the laws of the State, committed within their respective circuits or transferred to them for trial by change of venue from some other circuit court[.] HRS § 603-21.5(a)(1). This is a “fundamental and indispensable prerequisite [] to a valid prosecution.” State v. Alagao, 77 Hawaii 260, 261-62, 883 P.2d 682, 683-84 (App. 1994).

Using Counterfeit cash Constitutes “Uttering” a “Forged Instrument.” The ICA rejected Eberly’s argument that counterfeiting U.S. currency is not conduct fitting the forgery statutes. A person commits the act of forgery when the person “falsely makes, completes, endorses, or alters a written instrument, or utters a forged instrument[.]” HRS § 708-851. The language at issue centers around “utters a forged instrument.” See HRS § 708-853. The charge limited Eberly’s conduct to “uttering” a forged instrument. A “written instrument” is defined as any “paper, document, or other instrument containing written or printed matter or its equivalent” or a “token, coin, stamp, seal, badge, trademark, or other evidence or symbol of value, right, privilege, or identification[.]” HRS § 708-850(7). Finally, “utter” means “offer, whether accepted or not, a forged instrument with representation by acts or words, oral or in writing, that the instrument is genuine.” HRS § 708-850(8).

The factual basis for the guilty plea stated that Eberly gave Whitley a counterfeit $20 bill. According to the ICA, the bill is a “written instrument” because it’s a paper, containing printed matter. The act of giving it to Whitley was enough for the ICA to hold that handing it over to Whitley was enough to show forgery.

A Field Day for Appellate Attorneys? The actual issue in this case is not as newsworthy as the way the ICA got to it. One of the biggest problems for appellate attorneys once they are hired or appointed to a criminal case is to search the record for some shred of evidence showing that counsel preserved an issue on appeal. No one wants the appellate court to dodge an issue simply because it was never raised. That’s been the plain errorbattle raging in the HSC for some time now. The other big issue that arises comes with pleading guilty or no contest. Once that happens, then any issues that may have went down prior to the change of plea are considered waived and can’t be resurrected at trial. Now, it seems that jurisdiction can be the means to get certain issues before an appellate court—even if the defendant pleaded out and even if counsel never raised the issue below.

The DUI Exception to Miranda?

State v. Won (ICA March 28, 2014)
Background. Yong Shik Won was charged with a single count of operating a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant. Won was pulled over in the middle of the night by the police and taken to the police station. Once at the station, the police read to Won a form with numbered paragraphs. Paragraph 1 read that any person operating a vehicle on the roadway “shall be deemed to have given consent to a test or tests” to determine the driver’s blood-alcohol content (BAC). Paragraph 2 read that Won was “not entitled to an attorney before you submit to a test or tests[.]” Paragraph 3 read that Won may refuse to take a test “except as provided in section 291E-21. However, if you refuse, “you shall be subject to up to thirty days imprisonment and/or fine up to $1,000 or the sanctions of 291E-65, if applicable.”

Won initialed paragraphs 1 and 3, but not 2 (the bit about the attorney). He told the police that he did not agree with that and would not initial it. Then he signed and dated the form and said he agreed to take a breath test, but refused a blood test. The breath test was given and the results showed a BAC of 0.170.

Won filed a motion to suppress, which was denied by the district court (Hon. Judge David Lo), and was found guilty. Won appealed. The Attorney General’s office filed an amicus brief arguing that the implied consent laws were constitutional.

The Implied Consent Statutory Scheme. Any person operating a vehicle on a public way, street, road, or highway “shall be deemed to have given consent . . . to a test or tests” to determine the driver’s blood-alcohol level. HRS § 291E-11(a). The test can only be administered after the driver “has been informed by a law enforcement officer that the person may refuse to submit to testing under this chapter.” HRS § 291E-11(b)(2). If a person refuses to take a test, “none shall be given.” HRS § 291E-15. For a long time, the consequences for a refusal were administrative in nature. In other words, it would adversely affect the person’s driver’s license and was not a criminal offense. HRS §§ 291E-41 and 65.

But in 2011, the Legislature criminalized acts of refusal: “[R]efusal to submit to a breath, blood, or urine test as required by part II is a petty misdemeanor.” HRS § 291E-68. A petty misdemeanor carries maximum penalties of 30 days in jail and a  fine of up to $1,000. HRS § 706-663 and 706-640.

Won’s Miranda Argument. Won argued that because it is now a criminal offense to refuse chemical testing, the police are required to apprise him of his constitutional right to remain silent, right to confer with counsel even if he cannot afford one, and be told that anything he says can and will be used against him in court. Because the police failed to inform him of these rights, his response to the implied consent form is inadmissible and the breath test results must be suppressed as a fruit of the poisonous tree. The ICA disagreed.

Miranda Warnings Required in Custodial Interrogations . . . The United States and Hawaii constitutions require “that before any reference is made at trial to statements made by the accused during custodial interrogation, the prosecutor must first demonstrate that certain safeguards were taken before the accused was questioned . . . [T]he prosecutor must show that each accused was warned that he had a right to remain silent, that anything he said could be used against him, that he had a right to the presence of an attorney, and that if could no[t] afford an attorney one would be appointed for him.” State v. Ketchum, 97 Hawaii 107, 116, 34 P.3d 1006, 1015 (2001); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

These warnings are required when the suspect is (1) in custody and (2) subject to an interrogation. State v. Ketchum, 97 Hawaii at 118-19, 34 P.3d at 1017-18. The ICA agreed with Won that there is no question that when the form was presented to him at the police station, Won was in custody. The court disagreed about interrogation.

“Interrogation” arises when the police officer “should have known that his or her words or actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the person in custody.” Id. at 119, 34 P.3d at 1018; See also Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, (1980).

. . . but not Always. The ICA added that the law distinguishes a suspect being compelled to provide testimonial communications—in which Miranda applies—from being compelled to become the source of real or physical evidence. The communication, according to the ICA, is “testimonial” when the communication relates “to a factual assertion or disclose[s] information.” Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 589 (1990).

The Statutory Exception to Miranda Requirements!? The ICA rejected Won’s argument that Miranda warnings were required before being presented with the implied consent form. The ICA held inter alia that reading the form to Won did not constitute and interrogation and that his response was not a “testimonial communication.” According to the ICA, a DUI investigation presents “unique circumstances” for the police. The statutes require them to inform arrestees that they can refuse testing. In other words, their conduct in dealing with suspects is highly regulated by statute and is designed to prevent coercive police tactics Miranda was intended to protect. According to the ICA, the police are not looking for an incriminating response, but instead are just trying to comply with a statute. But putting that aside, the ICA concluded that the police inquiry “does not seek testimonial evidence because it is the act or conduct of refusing, not the means by which the refusal is communicated, that violates the criminal refusal statute.” In the end, the ICA held that presenting the form to Won did not constitute “interrogation” for Miranda purposes.

The Statutory Right to Counsel didn’t Apply Either. “It shall be unlawful in any case of arrest for examination . . . [t]o deny the person so arrested the right of seeing, at reasonable intervals and for a reasonable time at the place of the person’s detention, counsel or a member of the arrested person’s family . . . [and] [i]n case the person arrested has requested that the person see an attorney . . ., to examine the person before the person has had a fair opportunity to see and consult with the attorney[.]” HRS § 803-9. The ICA held that this statute, like Miranda, did not apply in Won’s case because this statute was in effect when the HSC came down with State v. Severino, CITE, which held that motorists are not entitled to consult with counsel before deciding on taking a test.
And even if this statutory right to counsel did apply, the ICA would not have suppressed the evidence. “Generally, where evidence has been obtained in violation of a statute, that evidence is not inadmissible per se in a criminal proceeding unless the statutory violation has constitutional dimensions” or if the defendant can show a nexus between the violation and the evidence. State v. Edwards, 96 Hawaii 224, 237-39, 30 P.3d 238, 251-53 (2001). Given the Miranda treatment, the ICA held that there was no constitutional dimension and Won failed to show the requisite nexus.

Telling Suspect he does not have the Right to Confer with Counsel is O.K. In addition to the constitutional and statutory rights, the forms themselves have to be accurate. “[A] driver’s ‘implied consent’ to an evidentiary chemical alcohol test is qualified by his or her implied right to refuse such a test after being accurately informed of his or her statutory right to consent or refuse, as well as the consequences of such consent or refusal.” State v. Wilson, 92 Hawaii 45, 49, 987 P.2d 268, 272 (1999). “Hawaii’s implied consent scheme mandates accurate warnings to enable the driver to knowingly and intelligently consent to or refuse a chemical alcohol test.” Id.

The ICA examined whether paragraph 2—which informed Won that he could not consult with an attorney before deciding on whether to take a test—was misleading. The ICA rejected this contention because there was no right to counsel to begin with.

Criminalizing the Act of Refusal is not Unconstitutional. The ICA moved on to reject Won’s contention that HRS § 291E-68 was unconstitutional. Won argued that in light of the recent case from the SCOTUS, Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), he had a constitutional right to refuse all chemical testing and the criminalization of that right is unconstitutional. In that case, the SCOTUS held that the warrantless removal of a suspect’s blood can be justified when the prosecution shows an exception to the warrant requirement and that exigency is not a per se exception.

The ICA distinguished McNeely on several grounds. First, it noted that McNeely involved the warrantless intrusion under the skin for extracting a person’s blood. Won submitted to a breath test, which is less intrusive. “Unlike blood tests, breath tests do not require piercing the skin and may be conducted safely outside a hospital environment and with a minimum of inconvenience or embarrassment.” Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 625 (1989). The ICA examined the refusal statute with regard to only breath tests, not blood tests. According to the ICA, McNeely did not address whether breath tests were subject to the warrant requirement or any of the remaining exceptions to the warrant requirement—like consent. The ICA examined the purpose of the implied consent scheme and balanced that against the privacy rights of drivers. In the end, the statute was deemed constitutional as it applied to breath tests anyway.

No Need for a Warrant in a Breath Test. The ICA made a short analysis about whether the police needed to obtain a search warrant before having Won submit to a breath test. In essence, it held that implied consent scheme was good enough for consenting to a search. It compared this scenario to airport inspections. See State v. Hanson, 97 Hawaii 71, 34 P.3d 1 (2001) (passenger’s implied consent to search toolbox at airport inspection extended to all contents in the box even after the passenger withdraws consent to search).

Editor’s Note. The ICA’s Miranda analysis is deeply strange. It is well-established that the police have to apprise suspects of their Miranda rights when they are in custody and subjected to an interrogation. An interrogation is determined when the police—by word or conduct—engage in express questioning or engage in conduct take action that they know or should know is likely to elicit an incriminating response. That’s it. There are no exceptions to this requirement.

And yet the ICA held that presenting implied consent forms requiring drivers to choose whether to submit to a test or refuse is not conduct by the police arising to “interrogation” for Miranda purposes. Why? How come? According to the ICA, the police are just complying with a statute—it is not designed to elicit incriminating statements—and thus, it is not something that the police know or should know to elicit an incriminating response.

What happens when a person refuses? What is a prosecution for a refusal supposed to look like? The best evidence of the refusal would be none other than the form and the statement from the driver that he or she “refused” to take a test. Certainly those are incriminating statements. Right? I guess not.